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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Klaus Gomez-Alas appeals from his judgment of conviction for misdemeanor battery and
infamous crime against nature, challenging his conviction for infamous crime against nature. He
submits this Reply Brief to respond to the State's legal argument on all three issues presented.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gomez included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant's
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (Appellant's Br., pp.1-8.)

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in concluding that the act of cunnilingus constitutes an infamous
crime against nature within the meaning ofldaho Code §§ 18-6605 & 18-6606?

II.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Gomez's conviction where there was no
evidence that his tongue penetrated Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening and no evidence that
the act he performed was against Ms. Zalazar's will?

III.

Did the district court err in providing the jury with a dynamite instruction after it
indicated it could not reach a unanimous decision on the charge of infamous crime
against nature?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Act Of Cunnilingus Constitutes An Infamous
Crime Against Nature Within The Meaning Ofldaho Code§§ 18-6605 & 18-6606
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred as a matter oflaw

in concluding Idaho Code §§ 18-6605 and 18-6606 prohibit cunnilingus as an infamous crime
against nature. (Appellant's Br., pp.10-13.) In its Respondent's Brief, the State relies on State v.

Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107, _, 157 P. 256, 257 (1916), for the proposition that the language of§
18-6605 clearly shows it was not the intention of the legislature to limit the infamous crime
against nature to sodomy. (Respondent's Br., p.4.) The Altwatter Court did indeed state that
"[t]he language of [the predecessor to §§ 18-6605 and 18-6606] clearly shows that it was not the
intention of the Legislature to limit prosecutions to the crime of sodomy and to omit the
inhibition and punishment of other infamous crimes against nature." 157 P. 256, 257. However,
the fact that the legislature did not intend to limit the coverage of the statute to sodomy does not
mean it intended for the statute to cover the act of cunnilingus.

B.

There Is No Indication That The Idaho Legislature Intended To Prohibit Cunnilingus
When It Criminalized The Infamous Crime Against Nature Back In 1864
Idaho Code § 18-6605 states, in full, that "[ e]very person who is guilty of the infamous

cnme against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than five years." The statute does not define the
infamous crime against nature, and the meaning of that phrase is therefore ambiguous, as it is
subject to more than one (and perhaps endless) interpretations. See City of Sandpoint v.

Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003) (stating standard for determining
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whether a statute is ambiguous). The State presents no argument about what the legislature
intended to prohibit back when it first prohibited the infamous crime against nature in 1864. See
State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting the infamous crime against nature

statute "has not been changed in substance since its adoption in 1864 as part of the territorial
laws, Laws of Territory of Idaho, Crimes and Punishments § 45 (1864)"). Instead, the State
simply asserts that "the upshot" of Altwatter and State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 830 (Ct. App.
1993), "is that oral sex, both fellatio and cunnilingus, fall[] within the prohibition against the
infamous crime against nature." (Respondent's Br., p.5.) The State's argument is not persuasive.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held multiple times that "the act of fellatio is included
within the statutory definition of crimes against nature," meaning it is an unnatural carnal
copulation. See, e.g., State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 669-70 (1975), see also State v. Brashier, 127
Idaho 730, 733 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing cases). But neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the
Idaho Court of Appeals has ever held the act of cunnilingus is included within the statutory
definition of crimes against nature. As Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief, Maland does
not stand for this proposition, and there is historical authority to the contrary from other
jurisdictions. (See Appellant's Br., pp.11-13.)
Mr. Gomez's argument on this issue is supported by the field of corpus linguistics, which
"in a legal setting allows reviewing courts ... to analyze the particular meaning of words in the

context of their linguistic usage patterns." See State v. Lantis, 165 Idaho 427, _, 447 P.3d 875,
880 (2019). The Corpus of Historical American English, or COHA, is a 400-million-word corpus
of text from 1810 to 2000 that the Idaho Supreme Court looked to in Lantis to determine the
historical meaning of the phrase "disturbing the peace." See id. at 880-81. The Lantis Court
noted counsel might be motivated to consider corpus linguistics as a "potential additional tool for
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our statutory interpretation toolbox .... " Id. at 881 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
same corpus utilized in Lantis, COHA, reflects that, from 1810 to 2010, the phrase "crime
against nature" was used a total of 17 times, and on none of those occasions did it encompass the
act of cunnilingus. The district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that §§ 18-6605 and
18-6606 prohibit cunnilingus as an infamous crime against nature.

II.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Gomez's Conviction Because There Was No
Evidence That His Tongue Penetrated Ms. Zalazar's Vaginal Opening, And No Evidence That
The Act He Performed Was Against Ms. Zalazar's Will
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief that the evidence was insufficient to support

his conviction for the infamous crime against nature because ( 1) there was no evidence that his
tongue penetrated Ms. Zalazar's vaginal opening; and (2) there was no evidence that the oral sex
act he performed on Ms. Zalavar was against her will. (Appellant's Br., pp.14-21.) With respect
to the first issue, the State argues licking "does not in a vacuum prove penetration, [but] it does
not disprove penetration." (Respondent's Br., p.7.) With respect to the second issue, the State
argues the sex act Mr. Gomez performed did not need to be against Ms. Zalazar's will in order to
constitute an infamous crime against nature. (Respondent's Br., p.8.) The State is incorrect on
both issues.

B.

There Was No Evidence That Mr. Gomez's Tongue Penetrated Ms. Zalazar's Vaginal
Opening
Idaho Code § 18-6606 states that "[ a ]ny penetration, however slight, is sufficient to

complete the crime against nature." Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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State, there was simply no evidence that Mr. Gomez's tongue penetrated, even slightly, into
Ms. Zalazar' s vaginal opening.
The State relies on State v. Brashier, 127 Idaho 730 (Ct. App. 1995), to support its
position that there was sufficient evidence of penetration (see Respondent's Br., p.10), but

Brashier in fact supports Mr. Gomez's position. At the preliminary hearing in Brashier, the
victim testified the defendant "attempted to push his penis into [her] mouth" but "[she] resisted
and tried to keep her mouth closed." 127 Idaho at 732. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
concluded the evidence supported a fmding of probable cause to believe that penetration
occurred, noting the victim's testimony that Mr. Brasher put his penis "in" her lips and "past" her
lips "constitutes substantial evidence of penetration sufficient to satisfy this element as it is
explained in I.C. § 18-6606." Id. at 733.
The evidence in the present case is easily distinguishable from the evidence in Brashier
as Ms. Zalazar never testified that Mr. Gomez placed his tongue "in" or "past" her vaginal
opening. Ms. Zalazar testified as follows on direct examination:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

What happened next?
He made me oral sex.
How did he make you oral sex?
He went down.
He went down with his head?
Yes.
And where did he put his head?
In my vagina.
Were you able to feel what was going on?
Yes.
Did you feel anything penetrate your vagina at that point?
I felt that it was being licked.
Being licked? Okay.
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(Tr., p.565, L.20 - p.566, L.8.) As Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief, licking is not
evidence of penetration, even slight penetration. (Appellant's Br., pp.16-17.) The evidence was
insufficient to support Mr. Gomez's conviction for infamous crime against nature.

C.

There Was No Evidence That The Act Mr. Gomez Performed Was Against Ms. Zalazar's
Will
The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of infamous crime against nature based on his tongue

penetrating "into the vaginal opening" of Ms. Zalazar "against her will." (R., pp.470-71.)
Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to show that the act he performed
was against Ms. Zalavar's will. (Appellant's Br., pp.17-21.) In its Respondent's Brief, the State
does not attempt to show Mr. Gomez's actions were against Ms. Zalazar's will, but instead
argues it did not have to prove "more than mere lack of consent." (Respondent's Br., p.12.) The
State is incorrect.
Courts are not, of course, typically "empowered to change the plain meanmg of
unambiguous legislation or to insert into statutes qualifying terms or provisions that obviously
are not there." Holden, 126 Idaho at 761 (citations omitted). However, in light of Lawrence v.

Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the district court instructed the jury in this case, consistent with the
allegation in the Information and without objection from counsel, that it had to find the
defendant's penetration was "against [Ms. Zalazar's] will." (R., pp. 110, 470-71.) The evidence
was insufficient to show that any penetration of Mr. Gomez's tongue into Ms. Zalazar's vaginal
opening was "against her will," and the district court erred in all but reading out this requirement
in denying Mr. Gomez's motion for judgment of acquittal.
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III.
The District Court Erred In Providing The Jury With A Dynamite Instruction After It Indicated It
Could Not Reach A Unanimous Decision On The Charge Oflnfamous Crime Against Nature
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in denying his

motion for a new trial because the court provided the jury with a dynamite instruction when it
to Id the jury it had to provide a verdict on Count II after it appears the jury was deadlocked.
(Appellant's Br., pp.22-29.) The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that the instruction the
district court provided was not a dynamite instruction because "the jury was not definitely
deadlocked and the district court did not exhort jurors to reconsider their decisions."
(Respondent's Br., p.14.) The record is to the contrary.

B.

The District Court Provided The Jury With A Coercive Dynamite Instruction After It
Appears The Jury Was Deadlocked
The State emphasizes the fact that when the jury first sent a note to the district court at

8:36 p.m., counsel for Mr. Gomez said it would be improper to presume the jury was
deadlocked. (Tr., p.1506, Ls.9-19; Respondent's Br., p.18.) However, Mr. Gomez does not
contend the deadlock occurred at this point-rather, this first note was a status update, and the
jury indicated after providing this update that it would continue deliberating. (Tr., p.1508, Ls.1624; Exs., p.6.) The deadlock occurred when, at 9: 13 p.m., the jury informed the court it had
reached a verdict, and that verdict did not include a finding of guilty or not guilty as to Count II.
(Tr., p.1509, L.21 - p.1510, L.5.) The jury's provision of the verdict form to the district court,
without a finding as to Count II, was in implicit declaration that it was deadlocked.
After seeing the incomplete verdict form, the district court instructed the jury, "We need
to have a decision on Count II." (Tr., p.1510, L.25.) The district court continued, "We need the
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other-we need you to evaluate the other count." (Tr., p.1511, Ls.12-13.) The State argues the
district court's instruction was not coercive. (Respondent's Br., p.19.) But this is of course the
question for this Court to consider-was the district court's instruction coercive, when presented
to a jury deliberating at 9:30 p.m., after six days of trial, that had already declared it was
struggling to reach a unanimous verdict? At what point does a district court's instruction have a
coercive effect upon minority jurors, in contravention of State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806 (1988)?
Mr. Gomez asserts he is entitled to relief in this case because he can show, not under
fundamental error review, that the instruction given by the district court may have had a coercive
effect upon minority jurors.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction for infamous crime against
nature and remand this case to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 17th day of January, 2020.
/s/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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